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RECENT NATURAL RESOURCES CASES
Rafe Regulation-Oil and Gas Pipeline CompaniesRejection of "Normalization" of Taxes*
The seemingly narrow holding of the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals in its 1966 Alabama-Tennessee Natural Gas Co. decision'
is this: In circumstances where there is a finding based on substantial
evidence that the jurisdictional investment rate base of a pipeline
using the accelerated depreciation alternatives to straight line depreciation, 2 as provided by the federal income tax laws, for the
foreseeable future will continue to be sufficiently incremented by
new, undepreciated investments to increase (or at least not diminish) the overall undepreciated rate base, the Federal Power Commission may, as a matter of administrative discretion, reject "normalization" of taxes for ratemaking purposes (accomplished by using
a theoretical calculated straight line depreciation in the ratemaking computation 8 ) and require flow-through of the accelerated
depreciation tax advantage by limiting the tax element of allowable
costs for ratemaking purposes to the income tax actually paid.
This case is but a way station along a road the Commission
appears to be traveling. Since Alabama-Tennessee, the Commission
has decided that a regulated pipeline company which elected to
return to straight line depreciation, its undoubted right under the
income tax laws,4 may have imposed upon it a ratemaking in terms
of theoretical calculated accelerated depreciation instead of taxes
* Alabama-Tennessee Natural Gas Co. v. FPC, 359 F.2d 318 (5th Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 847 (1966).
1. Alabama-Tennessee Natural Gas Co. v. FPC, 359 F.2d 318 (5th Cir. 1966),
cert. denied, 35 U.S.L. Week 3126 (U.S. Oct. 11, 1966). This appeal is from AlabamaTennessee Natural Gas. Co., 31 F.P.C. 208 (1964), a proceeding arising under the
Natural Gas Act §§ 4 (d) and (e), 52 Stat. 821 (1938), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 717
(c) (d) and (e) (1964) dealing with requested rate increases.
2. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 167 (b).
3. 359 F.2d at 326-27.
4. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 167 (e).
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actually paid.' This goes beyond the taxes-actually-paid rationale
of Alabama-Tennessee and invites an ultimate disposition in which
all regulated pipelines capable of accruing tax benefits through accelerated depreciation will be so treated for ratemaking purposes
whether or not that alternative ever was elected for tax purposes.
There is in progress a general rulemaking proceeding in which
the Commission purposes to establish the means and extent whereby
elimination of accelerated depreciation benefits generally shall be
visited upon jurisdictional pipelines through modification of its
uniform system of accounts."
This Commission trend represents a radical reversal of an
original 1956 position permitting normalization, with a full rate
of return applied to the fund accumulated thereby and charged with
the deferred future tax obligation, 7 which position was continued
until 19618 when it was modified to reduce the rate of return permitted on the fund to less than that allowed upon the rest of the
rate base. 9
There is another case development of much greater potential
significance now before the Supreme Court in which, if the Commission prevails, it may secure such absolute discretion in the
ratemaking process as to swallow-up and make academic Alabama5. Midwestern Gas Transmission Co., F.P.C. No. 497 (1966).
6. F.P.C. Docket No. R-264 July 7, 1964.
7. Amere Gas Util. Co., 15 F.P.C. 760 (1956).
8. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 22 F.P.C. 260, 265-69 (1959); United Fuel Gas Co.,
23 F.P.C. 127, 130-31 (1960) ; Phillips Petroleum Co., 24 F.P.C. 537, 570 (1960). This
position was inferentially supported by City of Detroit v. FPC, 230 F.2d 810 (D.C. Cir.
1955), dealing with amortization of emergency facilities pursuant to Int. Rev. Code of
1954, § 168, and upheld in City of Lexington v. FPC, 295 F.2d 109 (4th Cir. 1961), and
El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. FPC, 281 F.2d 567 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S.
912 (1961). The last case cited invited the treatment of the normalization fund discussed in note 9 infra.
9. Northern Natural Gas Co., 25 F.P.C. 431 (1961), upheld by sharply divided court
in Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co. v. FPC, 316 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. denied,
375 U.S. 881 (1963). The majority did not attack the validity of normalization but did
permit reduction of the return on the reserve fund it created to 1.5% instead of the
6.46%' permitted on the general rate base. In a notably sharp dissent the minority, (316
F.2d at 663), convincingly demonstrates that this tactic pro tanto thwarted the Congessional purpose in granting the accelerated depreciation privilege and suggests that,
far from being the product of greater administrative experience, was the result of an
abrupt change in regulatory philosophy occasioned by the radical change in membership (shown in detail at 359 F.2d 325, n.9). The "Eisenhower-Kennedy commissions"
dichotomy used in this and other regulatory areas as a shorthand means of expressing
the reason for these abrupt changes of direction is distasteful, but is a reality of
present administrative law which scarcely can be ignored by one who would understand the administrative process.
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Tennessee. That issue is whether tax savings attributable to losses
by non-jurisdictional companies, accomplished through consolidating
their tax returns with profitable jurisdictional company activities,
as permitted families of affiliated companies by the tax laws, may
be assigned proportionately to the jurisdictional activities, thereby
reducing rates. 10 The Commission's result can be superficially explained by the taxes-actually-paid rationale (a position from which
the Commission since has felt free to digress, however, where
lowered rates would result by compelling a straight line taxpayer
to use theoretical calculated accelerated depreciation1 1 ). But when it
is reflected that this advantage comes as a wholly fortuitious windfall to the cost of service ultimately to be borne by consumers, it
becomes apparent the Commission probably can be upheld only by
the fullest extension of the Hope Naturalrule, 2 which taken literally
forbids any judicial inquiry into the propriety of the elements considered by the Commission in establishing rates so long as the end
result is not "unjust or unreasonable." This is how the issue was
posed by the Tenth Circuit (and any such absolute extension rejected) in the leading case."8 The formulation was adopted by the
Fifth Circuit in its treatment of a subsequent case, which has now
4
become the test case before the Supreme Court.'
Finally, before proceeding to specific discussion of the AlabamaTennessee case, it should be noted there is no direct effect upon
producers of gas. Their battle to keep the tax benefits of percentage
depletion, a statutory substitute for depreciation that is permitted
10. For an explanation of the details of this process see Cities Serv. Gas. Co., 30
F.P.C. 159 (1963), followed in United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. FPC, 31 F.P.C. 1180
(1964), the test case presently before the Supreme Court for decision in its coming
1966-67 term. 357 F.2d 230 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. granted, 383 U.S. 924 (1966). The
income tax law sections involved are Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 1501, 1504.
11. See note 5 and accompanying text supra.
12. FPC v. Hope Natural Gas. Co., 320 U.S. 591, 602 (1944). The rule is no more
than a dictum in the context of this case which was concerned with whether determining the rate base by depreciated actual legitimate cost was proper.
13. Cities Serv. Gas. Co. v. FPC, 337 F.2d 97, 100-01 (10th Cir. 1964).
14. United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. FPC, 357 F.2d 230 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. granted,
383 U.S. 924 (1966). The Supreme Court sometimes evades the formulations of the
lower courts. E.g., North Dakota v. FPC, 247 F.2d 173 (8th Cir. 1957) ; Amerada Petroleum Corp. v. FPC, 334 F.2d 404 (8th Cir. 1964) ; Lo-Vaca Gathering Co. v. FPC,
323 F.2d 190 (5th Cir. 1963), formulating the issue in commingling of jurisdictional
with non-jurisdictional gas as one of resegregating fungible commodities in a meaningful manner. There is no recognition whatever of this formulation by the Supreme
Court in California v. Lo-Vaca Gathering Co., 379 U.S. 366 (1965), reversing Lo-Vaca
Gathering Co. v. FPC, supra.
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producers of wasting natural resources, was lost more than five
years ago, again in the Fifth Circuit. 6 The area rate methods now
in process of application obscure this treatment because under them
there are no longer individual producer ratemakings. But the consequence is very much present in continued refusal to permit calculated depletion equivalent to tax savings to be reflected in the
area ratemaking process. 16 In a very real sense it may be said that
rejection of normalization for the pipelines is no more than a parallel extension of the treatment already accorded producers of jurisdictional gas.
The Fifth Circuit's Alabama-Tennessee opinion rests on two
bases: (1) A determination that the most reasonable reconciliation of the earlier Natural Gas Act with the later amendment of
the tax laws permitting accelerated depreciation benefits is that
Congress did not intend, by its later enactment, to restrict the
usual ratemaking methods of the federal regulatory agencies. (2)
Hence the Commission, in its discretion, may elect either to normalize or require flow-through of the accelerated depreciation tax
benefit. Under the second point, however, there is confusion. On the
one hand the court seems to hold the option exists only when there
are specific findings, supported by substantial evidence, that a particular company, for the foreseeable future, will have an expanding
(or at the very least stable) undepreciated rate base. 1 7 On the
other hand, adverting to the Hope Natural rule, the court seems
also to plant its decision on the impregnable citadel that the Commission can commit any error in structuring its ratemakings, and
the detail cannot be inquired into so long as the resulting revenues
are not "unjust or unreasonable" 8S-whatever
that means."
15. El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. FPC, 281 F.2d 567 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied,
366 U.S. 912 (1961). The income tax law section involved was Int. Rev. Code of 1954,

§ 613.

16. [Permian Basin] Area Rate Proceeding, F.P.C. No. 468 (1965). For a more detailed review of the reasoning underlying this treatment, see Phillips Petroleum Co.,
24 F.P.C. 537, 568, 707-23 (1960). This is the leading individual producer ratemaking
proceeding. In it, it was announced that individual ratemakings would be abandoned in
favor of consolidated industrywide area ratemakings.
17. Alabama-Tennessee Natural Gas Co. v. FPC, 359 F.2d 318, 323, 328-30 (5th
Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 35 U.S.L. Week 3126 (U.S. Oct. 11, 1966).
18. Id. at 331.
19. In New England Tel. & Tel. Co. v. State, 95 N.H. 353, 64 A.2d 9 (1949), the
idea that the Hope Natural rule operated to free regulatory bodies from judicial review of the correctness of application of their methods once chosen is criticized by a
state court. The Supreme Court has given no hint of any such view, however, in the
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The court correctly states that the legislative histories underlying
the problem contain no unmistakable congressional manifestation
of intent one way or the other; also that the normal ratemaking
treatment of expense items, including taxes, is in terms of costs
actually incurred. Even so, discerning the congressional purpose is
not the "unmalleable granite" 20 the court contends in reaching what
the writer believes a wrong result. The court's construction, in the
final analysis, is premised on the tactic of charging Congress with
an obligation to speak affirmatively if it would avoid the consequence decreed. 21 This is unsound and, for a busy Congress, unreasonable.
The tax law permitting election of accelerated depreciation,
while no more or less specific than the Natural Gas Act in the area
of interest, is later in point of time, an important consideration in
statutory construction. 22 Immediately after its passage the Commission, adhering to analogous principles developed with regard to
Korean War tax amortization of emergency facilities (a treatment
known to Congress), held itself bound to accord normalization.2 3
Its treatment was upheld on appeal 24 and, when the line was pro
tanto breached in 1961 to the extent of reducing the rate of return
on the normalization fund, there was even to that treatment a
strong dissent by a five-to-four divided District of Columbia Circuit. 25 Because it disliked what it believed the law required of it, the
more than twenty years since the Hope Natural rule was enunciated. It is at least likely
that review of federal ratemakings will be confined to measuring results. The effect,
assuming a regulatory decision that is not patently outrageous, means prompt review
is rendered impossible. Whether a rate is unjust or unreasonable as a matter of result
can be tested only in terms of future revenues generated and consequent effect upon
the marketability of the regulated company's stocks and bonds. Not only this, but by
the time adverse results become apparent, it can be anticipated the Commission will
have shifted to a new regulatory method which will purport to ameliorate the situation. See the suggestion in Alabama-Tennessee, 359 F.2d at 339. This will precipitate
a new waiting period, and if that attempt fails to produce desirable results again and
again, this, in effect, will indefinitely insulate the ratemaking process from effective
review by the courts.
20. 359 F.2d at 331.
21. Ibid.
22. Consider the dissenting opinion in Panhandle E. Pipeline Co. v. FPC, 316 F.2d
659, 663 (D.C. Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 881 (1963).
23. See the Commission cases cited in notes 7 & 8 supra.
24. See the court cases cited in note 8 supra.
25. Panhandle E. Pipeline Co. v. FPC 316 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 1961), cert. denied,
375 U.S. 881 (1963).
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Commission encouraged Congress to consider remedial legislation.2 6
Congress refused to vary the treatment.2 7 As a matter of technical
construction this should be enough to reach an opposite result.
But there is more. Accelerated depreciation 2 is a part of the
Internal Revenue Code, a law of general application to all taxpayers, regulated and unregulated. If it be conceded that a jurisdictional company can elect straight line depreciation, pay taxes on
that basis, and have its rates calculated on the taxes actually paid
as a matter of right, 29 it must be recognized that the reserve fund
derived from the accelerated depreciation alternatives (and held for
eventual discharge of the future increased tax burden resulting
from the acceleration) is no more than the economic equivalent of
permitted straight line depreciation.
The argument that the tax can be indefinitely deferred is specious.
It cannot be deferred as to the investment in any particularfacil.
ities after their installation beyond the relatively short period resulting from choosing accelerated depreciation which the law
permits. Dislike of a gross overall effect through time, which most
emphatically does favor an expanding company, should not be permitted to obscure this vital reality. The contrary view, here adopted
by Commission and court, permits current consumers to avoid a
cost of service burden properly theirs, and progressively thrust
forward current costs upon consumers of the more remote future.
26. 1957 FPC Ann. Rep. 75; 1956 FPC Ann. Rep. 75. There can be no doubt the
Congress was thoroughly aware of the mandatory interpretation while it was in effect.
S. Rep. No. 1380, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-6 (1958) ; S. 2113, H.R. 5824, 85th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1957).
27. S. 2113, H.R. 5824, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957). On the other hand, the Fifth
Circuit points to a 1964 effort to make normalization unmistakably mandatory after
the Commission had changed its position, which also was not enacted, apparently intending to cancel the effect of one effort by the other. 359 F.2d at 334. The shifts of
political alignment which constantly occur from Congress to Congress are inescapable
facts. But, to the extent subsequent Congressional inaction is relied upon to supply intent, the test closest to point of time to the passage of the statute should control.
Here the first test was within three years of passage of the accelerated depreciation
alternatives, when there would have been comparatively little change in membership
and the memory of what was intended in a fairly recent enactment would have been
fresh.
28. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 167 (b).
29. This seemingly obvious proposition is under challenge, however. See note 5
and accompanying text supra. When the Commission acts against the interest of a
company actually using straight line depreciation, it should come into such total conflict
with the congressional purpose to permit either that the Commission action could be
upheld only by full extension of the Hope Natural rule. See notes 12, 19 supra for a
discussion of this rule.
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And it is not rational, however solemn the findings or well protected by the substantial evidence rule of review, to premise ratemaking procedures on findings, which can never be more than
doubtful speculation, of indefinite, unbroken future growth.
Even this is not all. The strongest point remains. The court
points to the specific 1964 congressional denial of authority to include the benefits of the investment tax credit advantage, first
granted in 1962 in the ratemaking process, contrasting this with its
case where there is no specific denial.30 But consider this. The Commission openly moved to claim this credit both by decisional pro32
cess 31 and by importuning Congress that the treatment be left to it
in this two-year interval. Congress, thus appraised of the Commission's purpose, then specifically directed the advantage was for
3
the sole benefit of the taxpayer.
The conference report attending the 1962 enactment of the
investment tax credit states:
[The purpose] in the case of both regulated and non-regulated industries is to encourage modernization and expansion of the Nation's
productive facilities and to improve its economic potential by reducing the net cost of acquiring new equipment, thereby increasing the
earnings of the new facilities over their productive lives. 34
After hearing the importunings of the regulators, who had already
moved to claim this benefit for consumers in the face of this language, Congress acted emphatically, stating that the Commissioner's view of the 1962 law was "clearly contrary to the intent of
Congress," and "it was not . . . [the] intention [of Congress]
that the Federal regulatory agencies require the benefit of the investment credit to 'flow through' in this manner." '
The stated congressional purpose of accelerated depreciation in
1954 was "to increase available working capital and materially aid
growing business in the financing of expansion."8 " Apart from the
specific reference to both regulated and non-regulated industries,
which cannot reasonably be given more standing than redundancy
30. 359 F.2d at 331-34.
31. FPC Interim Order in Docket No. 232, January 23, 1964.
32. Hearings on H.R. 836 Before Senate Finance Committee, 88th Cong. 1st Sess.
1797-1801 (1963).
33. Int. Rev. Act of 1964, § 203 (e).
34. H.R. Rep. No. 2508, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1962).
35. H.R. Rep. No. 749, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 37 (1963).
36. S. Rep. No. 1622, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1954).
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when it is recalled that the subject matter was a tax law of general
application, this writer can see no distinction except that, in the
case of the investment tax credit, Congress was compelled by threatened Commission action to make so explicit a reiteration of its
original 1962 intent as to raise a barrier insuperable to contrary
interpretation. Certainly there is no satisfaction in the ipsi dixit of
the Fifth Circuit, first advanced in the case which denied producers
the usual benefits of percentage depletion, and now in .41abamaTennessee to deny the usual benefits of accelerated depreciation:
[These benefits] are available to regulated companies to make it so
much easier for them, in competition with other fuels and in competition with other industries seeking the investor's dollar to earn a
fair return .... 37
Unless one is willing to attribute to Congress an incredible degree
of sophistication, attended by incredible obscurity of expression, and
then attempt to explain away the obvious fact that the unregulated
competitor for investment dollars is very unequally advantaged,
he must hold this attempted justification wholly inadequate. Where
is the increase in working capital for the regulated company? By
what authority are certain taxpayers singled out and so unequally
treated? Why is not the same natural reading of one Congressional
purpose applied to all?
WILLIAM J. FLITTIEt

37. 359 F.2d at 329-30.
t Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University, Dallas, Texas.

